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This chapter deals with the distortions to price incentives for agriculture that result from the 
trade, exchange rate and domestic policies in place in the four main South Asian countries, by 
summarizing and comparing the findings and themes of the more-detailed case studies on India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
1 Attention is paid most to India, which accounts for around 
four fifths of South Asia’s population, GDP and agricultural GDP.
2 The principal focus is on the 
level of and trends in distortions for agriculture as a whole
3, and how these have changed over 
time relative to those for non-agricultural traded sectors (principally manufacturing) in these 
countries. Previous studies have established that in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, policies 
strongly favored manufacturing over the principal agricultural crops, although the extent of anti-
agricultural bias diminished considerably between the 1970s to 1995 (Pursell 1999, p. 30).
 4 The 
new country studies extend the earlier estimates up to 2005 and back to 1965, and provide long 
term estimates of distortions to relative agricultural incentives in Bangladesh for the first time,
5
                                                 
1 This chapter is a synthesis of the authors’ paper on India (Pursell, Gulati and Gupta 2009).and three other South 
Asian country studies, namely Ahmed, Bakht, Dorosh and Shahabuddin (2009), Bandara and Jayasuriya (2009), and 
Dorosh and Salam (2009). The analytical narratives are available in Anderson and Martin (2009), and the detailed 
estimates have been integrated into the project’s global database (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). We attempt to 
summarize the findings in a coherent manner rather than a critique of the findings and quantitative estimates in the 
individual country studies. 
2 These four countries account for over  98 percent of South Asian agricultural GDP. The region’s smaller 
economies of Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives were not included in the project, nor Afghanistan.   
3 Here and in some other places in this chapter the term “agriculture” is used broadly to include not only crop 
agriculture (including horticulture) and livestock activities – which is the focus of the global agricultural distortions 
project – but also inland and ocean fisheries and forestry activities. In the tables and figures reporting NRA 
estimates and in most of the rest of the text the word “agriculture” means crop agriculture, horticulture and livestock 
activities. Whether the broad or narrower meaning of the term is intended should be apparent from the context.  
4 Unless otherwise indicated, throughout this chapter national fiscal years are referred to as in the following 
examples: India 1997 = fiscal 1997/98 (April 1 1997-March 31 1998); Pakistan and Bangladesh 1997=fiscal 
1996/97 (July 1 1996-June 30 1997); Sri Lanka 1997=fiscal 1997 (January 1 1997 –December 31, 1997).    
 
5 Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan in 1971 but separate data on the Bangladesh agricultural sector was 
not available until 1974. Before 1971 only limited data and NRA estimates on agriculture in  the then East Pakistan  
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As well, these new studies broaden the coverage of previous research by including estimates for 
the fresh fruit and vegetables sector in India,  and the dairying sectors in India and Pakistan. In 
South Asia both of these sectors account for large shares of the rural economy as measured by 
their contributions to GDP.  
The chapter first summarizes how over the past four decades agriculture has steadily 
declined in relation to both the economies and the trade of the South Asian countries. This is 
followed by a discussion which points out that agriculture nevertheless still accounts for more 
than half of South Asian employment, that the share of food in household budgets remains very 
high, and that on both counts agricultural policies are highly sensitive politically. The next 
sections describe how the South Asian countries’ trade policies have evolved and have interacted 
with exchange rate changes, especially during the period of the steady and in the end massive 
devaluation of the Indian Rupee which started in 1984 and ended in 1992. Quantitative evidence 
is then summarized, on the long term evolution of nominal rates of assistance to various 
agricultural sub-sectors (including via input subsidies) and to agriculture as a whole. This leads 
into a discussion of trends in incentives for farmers relative to incentives for producers of non-
agricultural tradables (mainly manufactures). Finally, we discuss the political economy forces 
that are likely to influence the direction of future  policies in the region, including the possibility 
that  a strong pro-agricultural bias may emerge along the lines followed by more-advanced 
densely populated economies in East Asia and elsewhere.  
 
 
Agriculture and the South Asian Economies   
 
 
The Indian agricultural economy is much larger than the agricultural economies of the other 
South Asian countries. In 2000 the country shares in total South Asian agricultural GDP were 
India 77 percent, Pakistan 11 percent, Bangladesh 8 percent and Sri Lanka 2.2 percent (with 
Nepal at 1.5 percent). Agriculture is more specialized in the smaller countries. In particular 
                                                                                                                                                             
are included in the  Pakistan country study. In particular there is no information on rice production,  NRAs or 
policies in East Pakistan.   
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Pakistan specializes in wheat and Bangladesh in rice, but even so their production is much less 
than India’s.  
  With economic development, the share of agriculture in the South Asian economies has 
steadily declined (table 1). Most of this decline has been in crop agriculture and horticulture. In 
India, at independence these two were more than half of GDP, but by 2003 they represented 15 
percent of GDP. By contrast, in India and Pakistan the livestock sectors have grown faster than 
the rest of the rural primary sector. In India the livestock sector is about a quarter of agricultural 
GDP and in Pakistan almost half (while having a much smaller role in the rural economies of 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka).   
   Fisheries and forestry are not included in the agricultural aggregates or the quantitative 
analysis of this project. They have relatively low GDP shares in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
but, given the importance of fisheries in Bangladesh (in 2004 22 percent of broadly defined 
agriculture including fisheries and forestry), caution is in order in generalizing from the analysis 
below for Bangladesh’s broader rural economy. 
     
Agriculture and trade 
 
For India, international trade in agricultural products (understood in the broad sense to also 
include livestock, fish and forest products) has always been tiny in relation to the size of India’s 
agricultural sector. In 2003/04 imports of these products were only 0.6 percent of the value of 
sectoral production (2.4 percent with edible oil imports included) and exports were 5.7 percent of 
production. In earlier periods agricultural imports and exports had major shares in total Indian 
trade (e.g. in 1961 they were respectively 27 percent and 44 percent of total merchandise imports 
and exports), but each still only accounted for just above 3 percent of agricultural production. 
From around the late 1960s agricultural imports were substituted by domestic production, and 
since then they have constituted very small shares of total imports, even in years when there 
were imports of products such as wheat and sugar due to poor seasons. 
  Over time the share of agricultural products in India’s total merchandise exports has also 
declined, in recent years to around 10 percent. However the products exported are very diverse: 
they include fish and fish preparations, oil cakes, cashew kernels, tea, coffee, tobacco, spices, 
fruit and vegetables, pulses, basmati rice and, periodically, large quantities of sugar and common  
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rice (e.g. over 4 million tons of rice during 2004). Since the late 1980s manufactures have 
usually accounted for 70-80 percent of India’s total merchandise exports, compared to between 
40 percent and 50 percent during the 1950s and 1960s. Indian service exports have also been 
growing very rapidly in recent years. The most dynamic components are software exports, other 
information technology related exports, and service outsourcing. Together, exports from these 
activities were about $US20 billion during 2004, touched $50 billion in 2008,  and were 
increasing at about 20 to 25 percent annually. There is so far no similar development in the other 
South Asian countries. 
  Agricultural trade has also declined in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, both in 
relation to total agricultural production and as a share of total exports and imports. On the import 
side, as in India, this was mainly a consequence of determined policies aimed at foodgrain self 
sufficiency, especially through “green revolution” technologies. Currently Pakistan exports rice 
and during normal seasons is self sufficient in wheat. Similarly, Bangladesh is self sufficient in 
rice during normal seasons, and imports small quantities of  wheat. Sri Lanka is normally self 
sufficient in rice, but this is an outcome of substantial imports of wheat which is not produced 
domestically and which (as flour) has inceased over time as a share of household consumption.  
  The outcome of these changes is that in Pakistan “primary commodities” (including 
cotton) are currently around 11 percent of total imports and 11 percent of total exports,  
compared with 26 percent of total imports and 39 percent of total exports in 1973 (Hamid et al. 
1990). In Sri Lanka, agricultural exports (mainly tea, rubber and coconut products) were over 90 
percent of total exports during the 1960s and 1970s, but by 2005 their share had declined to 18 
percent, the rest being industrial exports, almost entirely ready made garments. Over the same 
period agricultural and processed food imports declined from almost half of total imports to 
around 11 percent recently: most imports are now intermediate manufactured materials 
(especially textiles for the ready made garment exporters), machinery and equipment and 
manufactured consumer goods.  
  In Bangladesh the pattern is somewhat different. Ready made garments now dominate 
total exports: agricultural exports (at present  almost entirely jute and shrimp) are usually about 
7-8 percent of total exports compared with 40 percent ( mainly jute and tea) in the mid-1970s. 
However, Bangladesh imports a wide range of agricultural products (wheat, cotton, sugar, edible 
oils, dairy products, spices, oil seeds,  tobacco, and periodically  rice).  According to the official  
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trade statistics imports of these products varied between about 12  percent and 18 percent of total 
imports between 2001 and 2005, and this share had declined only slightly since the mid-1990s. 
But the share of agricultural products in Bangladesh’s total imports would be considerably 
higher than this if allowance were made for well documented and very substantial unrecorded 
imports from India, especially of sugar and cattle. 
  The largest consistent quasi-agricultural imports in South Asia are edible oils. In India 
these expanded rapidly during the 1970s and early 1980s, and this triggered a major government 
program to substitute for the imports with domestic production. For a while edible oil imports 
declined, but despite very high tariffs (e.g. for palm oil in 2006, 80 percent applied to tariff 
values which, however, was brought down to 5 percent in 2008 in the wake of surging global 
prices), import growth resumed during the 1990s and the 2000s. During 2000-2004 Indian 
imports were running at about $US2.5 billion annually and accounted for about 40 percent of 
domestic consumption. Edible oils (mainly palm oil from Malaysia and Indonesia) are also major 
imports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Tariffs are high, but not nearly as high as 
in India,
6
In India , although the rural sector’s contribution to GDP has declined by almost two-thirds since 
independence, in 2003 it still accounted for 58 percent of national employment.  The shares of 
agricultural employment in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have also come down during the 
past 40 years (Table 1) but, as in India, at a much slower rate than the decline in agriculture’s 
share in GDP.
 which creates strong incentives in neighboring countries, especially Bangladesh and 
Nepal, to smuggle edible oils into India.    
 
Employment,  food expenditure, and food safety nets 
 
7
  Although slowly declining, the share of food expenditure in South Asian household 
budgets is very high, in Indian rural and urban areas during 2003 respectively about 54 percent 
   
                                                 
6 Indian palm oil and other edible oil tariffs were drastically reduced during 2008 in order to stabilize domestic  
prices during a surge in world edible oil prices. 
7 According to these statistics the overall agricultural employment share of the four countries during 2000-04 was 57 
percent, but somewhat surprisingly, compared to India, the agricultural employment share was lower in Bangladesh 
(54 percent) and much lower (46 percent) in Pakistan. These contrasts between the South Asian countries’ 
agricultural employment rates are very likely to a large extent the result of differences in the design of  national 
employment surveys.  
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and 42 percent of total per capita consumption expenditure. The shares of food in the budgets of 
the poorest 10 percent was much higher, around 62 percent in rural areas and 58 percent in urban 
areas. With such high shares in family budgets, it is not surprising that food prices and food 
availability are highly sensitive politically. There is similar sensitivity to food prices in the other 
South Asian countries. 
  One of the key objectives that Indian government pursued since independence is to 
permanently eliminate the recurrence of catastrophic famines that occurred during the colonial 
period, and ensure basic foods to its citizens at affordable prices. In pursuit of these objectives, 
the government intervened in the food grain markets, and in 1958 established the present public 
distribution system (PDS), which had its roots in the rationing system introduced in 1939 during 
pre-war years. The current PDS sells basic foods at subsidized prices through large number 
(currently about 460,000) of “fair price” shops. In June 1997 the system was modified to 
Targeted PDS by distinguishing “below poverty line” (BPL) and “above poverty line” (APL) 
buyers, with the former eligible for especially low prices and the latter eligible to buy at prices 
which were only slightly below free market prices. In 2004 the total central government food 
subsidy was estimated at Rs 258 billion (about $US 5.7 billion and 0.83 percent of GDP), 
defined as the excess of FCI’s total procurement handling and distribution costs over the 
subsidized sales value.  
  In the past similar policies to India’s were followed in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka, but most have been phased out and are no longer such important factors in the food grain 
and other agricultural markets of these countries. In Pakistan, ration shops were abolished in the 
late 1980s, although the government continues to subsidize wheat to private flour mills to keep 
the flour prices low for consumers. Bangladesh inherited a system of public grain distribution 
(rice and wheat) from its  pre-independence period as East Pakistan, and this system became 
especially important following a 1974 famine. Sales of subsidized  wheat and rice (about two 
thirds was wheat imported under food aid programs) continued during the 1980s, but during the 
early 1990s the subsidy rates were gradually reduced and phased out. Currently the principal 
safety net for poor consumers consists of  food-for-work and food transfers, mainly of wheat. 
Following its independence, Sri Lanka also operated subsidy schemes for food grains distributed 
through ration shops. During the 1950s and 1960s this mainly consisted of imported rice, but 
later on -- as in Bangladesh -- wheat became the principal vehicle for the subsidies, as it could be  
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purchased more cheaply than rice on world markets. The subsidies were very large (some rice 
was distributed free) and had high budgetary costs, especially during the 1970s world price 
boom. In part due to the high budgetary costs, the subsidies were reduced after 1977 and the rice 
ration scheme was abolished in 1979. Since then the main objective of policy has been to keep 
consumer prices stable around “reasonable” price levels, balancing this objective against the 




For the four South Asian countries, self-sufficiency in food grains has been a major objective.  In 
pursuit of self-sufficiency, the “green revolution” development package comprised an array of 
government initiatives and subsidies for farmers. In India, for example, the largest of these farm 
subsidies are for electricity and fertilizers (Gulati and Narayanan 2003). Estimates of the 
incidence of the total of these two subsidies across 11 crop in 2004 are summarized in Table 2. 
In 2008, however, the fertilizer subsidy has assumed gigantic proportions, touching almost $25 
billion as global prices of fertilizers rose sharply, allowing domestic prices to remain largely 
unchanged. 
  In Pakistan about 80 percent of cropped area is irrigated. However, except for urea, most 
input subsidies were phased out or substantially reduced during the 1990s. Bangladesh inherited 
a complex system from Pakistan by which fertilizers, pesticides, seeds and irrigation (tubewell) 
equipment were supplied to farmers at subsidized prices by monopoly government organizations. 
With the important exception of the fertilizer subsidies, these subsidies plus the accompanying 
controls were withdrawn in the late 1970s. Since then the principal farm input subsidy has been 
for urea: subsidies for non-nitrogenous fertilizers-all of which are imported-were abolished in 
1991 but reintroduced in 2005. In Sri Lanka the government built a very large canal irrigation 
system (large relative to the size of Sri Lanka’s agricultural sector and economy) starting in 1979 
and continuing during the 1980s. This supplies canal water at subsidized prices. There are also 
subsidies for fertilizers, seeds, extension and research. Of these the largest are the fertilizer 
subsidies.  
   




For 45 years after its independence, India followed restrictive trade policies. During the 1950s 
and 1960s agricultural exports were controlled, and when exports were allowed, they were 
subject to high export taxes, for example on jute and jute products, oilcakes, cotton, tea and black 
pepper. Nearly all imports were either subject to discretionary import licensing or were 
“canalised” by monopoly government trading organizations. Import licensing was regularly 
tightened in response to the steadily worsening foreign exchange situation, and tariffs were 
increased and reached very high levels by early 1966. It is highly likely that the period’s policies 
were characterized by a marked anti-agricultural bias, which probably increased along with the 
increasing overvaluation of the exchange rate and the counter measures for industry which 
concentrated on providing higher incentives to manufacturers, both in the domestic market and to 
their exports, while attempting to keep agricultural prices low and stable.  
In June 1966 the Rupee was devalued, and this was accompanied by a brief liberalization 
episode during which import licensing was relaxed, tariffs were cut, and export subsidies were 
abolished or reduced. However, the import licensing system remained intact and by 1968 most of 
the liberalizing initiatives had been reversed and tight import and domestic controls reinstated. 
This remained the situation until the end of the 1970s, when a new phase of very slow partial 
liberalization commenced. During these years inflation was steadily reduced, and by 1980 the 
real effective exchange rate (REER) had declined by 46 percent (figure 1). A balance of 
payments crisis was averted in 1980 and 1981 with the help of an IMF loan while maintaining 
the real value of the Rupee, but from about April 1985 a new policy commenced under which the 
currency was steadily devalued in real terms. This continued without a break for the next six 
years, almost on a monthly basis, until a large sharp devaluation was imposed in July 1991, 
followed by about another year of further depreciations until September 1992. The real Rupee 
devaluation was very large during the second half of the 1980s, about 62 percent between 1985 
and 1990, and over the whole period to 1992 it was around 145 percent (figure 1).  
Among other things, these devaluations radically changed the environment for India’s 
trade policies, and had important repurcussion especially for the manufacturing sector, which 
was first exposed to liberalization policies. It made the trade liberalization program that started in 
1991 (see below) quite painless. Also, many Indian manufacturing firms that had felt vulnerable 
to import competition now found that, following the correction of the earlier exchange rate  
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overvaluation, they could not only easily compete with imports but could outcompete foreign 
manufacturers in export markets. Combined with new sweeping domestic deregulation of 
manufacturing that accompanied the 1991 trade policy reform program, this created a new 
momentum in the manufacturing sector in terms of investment, productivity improvements, and 
output expansion. It also commenced a four-year program of tariff reductions, which brought 
tariffs down to levels which were far below the extremely high or prohibitive rates (averaging 
over 100 percent) of the 1980s, but which were still very high by international standards. But 
both domestic and trade policies affecting the rural sector were basically untouched by the 1991 
reforms.  
  After 1992 and still continuing in mid-2008, the exchange rate has been managed by 
regular adjustments of the nominal rates (figure 1). In the mid 1990s – five years after the 1991 
reforms – about two-thirds of tradable GDP was still protected by some kind of explicit non-
tariff barrier: about 36 percent of manufacturing, 84 percent of agriculture, and 40 percent of 
mining. During the second half of the 1990s this began to change, in large measure as a response 
to international pressures linked to the Uruguay Round agreements and the negotiations 
associated with them. Starting in 1998, the general import licensing system was gradually 
dismantled, and on April 1, 2001 the last 715 of 2714 tariff lines (which included nearly all the 
agricultural tariff lines) were removed and the system itself was abolished.  
After the lifting of the import licensing controls, existing tariffs proved more than 
adequate to keep out competing imports, both manufactured and agricultural. At the same time, 
manufactured exports entered a new phase of very rapid expansion which was still continuing in 
2007 (at around 20-25 percent annually), and this was supplemented by similar fast growth of 
services exports. Together with increased capital inflows, these developments created a strong 
balance of payments and historically high foreign exchange reserves (more than $300 billion by 
August 2008), and were accompanied by fast general economic growth (almost 9 percent per 
year during 2005-08).  
Responding to the new confidence that these changes created, in April 2003 a new 
program of drastic reductions in industrial tariffs commenced, which over the next four years 
reduced the average by approximately two-thirds, from over 33 percent to about 12 percent 
(figure 2). This was followed by a further reduction in the 2007 budget. After these cuts, as  
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measured by average ad valorem industrial tariffs, from being one of the world’s most protected 
countries India became one of the world’s low-protection countries.  
However, from the beginning, agriculture and processed foods were left out of the new 
tariff reduction program. In 2006 unweighted average tariffs protecting these sectors (HS 01-24) 
were about 40 percent (figure 2), almost four times the level of India’s average industrial tariffs 
and among the highest in the world. This high formal protection of agriculture, combined with 
high input subsidies, allows considerable scope for the past anti-agricultural bias of the system to 
move to a pro-agricutural policy bias. The situation on the agricultural tariff front, however, 
changed dramatically in 2007-08 when global prices shot up: India lowered tariffs on several 
commodities (especially edible oils and grains) and imposed export controls on rice, wheat and 
corn. 
 
Trade and exchange rate policies: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
 
Because of their common history as British colonies, it is not surprising that there are many 
similarities between the  trade and exchange rate policies of  Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
since their independence, and India’s policies. Soon after independence, Pakistan adopted an 
import substitution strategy which protected manufacturing firms against imports behind non-
tariff and tariff barriers. Sri Lanka followed similar highly interventionist trade policies. When it 
seceeded from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh inherited  Pakistan’s import substitution policies 
and gave them special emphasis, since up to that point few manufacturing activities had been 
established on its territory. Like India, during the 1960s Pakistan and Sri Lanka fixed their  
nominal exchange rates but inflation rapidly appreciated the real exchange rates. Both countries 
attempted to handle the resulting pressures on the current account by schemes which raised the 
Rupee price of foreign exchange for manufactured exports and also for remittances from 
nationals working in foreign countries. However  “traditional” agricultural exports which 
accounted for the largest share of total export earnings (about 90 percent in Sri Lanka) were not 
only subject to the overvalued official rate, but also to export controls and high export taxes. In 
Pakistan these policies strongly discriminated against rice and cotton and before 1971 jute and 
tea, which were produced in the then East Pakistan. In Sri Lanka they discriminated against the 
principal export crops which were tea, rubber and coconut products.   
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   A big devaluation of the Pakistan Rupee in 1971/72 – by about half in relation to the US 
dollar - for a while reduced the growing foreign exchange distortions. But during the rest of the 
1970s domestic inflation continued to appreciate the real exchange rate and erode export 
competitiveness. This changed in 1981 when a long term series of nominal devalutions 
commenced which consistently exceeded the excess of Pakistan’s domestic inflation over 
average inflation in its principal trading partners. Real devaluation (as measured by Pakistan’s 
REER index) continued in just about every year between 1981 and 2004, and over the 23 years 
totalled about 137 percent, being was particularly steep between 1984 and 1990 (about 67 
percent).
8
         During Bangladesh’s early independence years after 1971, the Taka exchange rate initially 
reflected the devaluation of the Pakistan Rupee which occurred at the same time. But the general 
political, social and economic disruption caused by the secession war was exacerbated by 
drought and floods and led to high inflation. Despite continuing use of quantitative import 
restrictions and high tariffs, this created serious problems for the tradable sectors, and the 
government responded during 1975 with a very large Taka devaluation estimated at about 66 
percent in real terms (Rahman 1994). The Taka continued to be devalued up to 1980, in real 
terms by about another 16 percent. Since 1980, in marked contrast to India and Pakistan, the 
Bangladesh exchange rate has been managed so as to keep the REER index quite stable around a 
slowly devaluing long term trend of just under 1 percent a year. During the 1980s this was 
sufficient to ensure that the secondary rate did not diverge very far from the official rate, and 
made it possible to gradually merge the two rates and unify them in January 1992. It was also 
sufficient to support a sweeeping trade liberalization program which started slowly in the second 
half of the 1980s and sped up between 1991 and 1996 with the removal of most quantitative 
 As in India, this long term devaluation underpinned sweeping trade liberalization 
reforms during the 1990s, which removed most QRs and drastically cut tariffs. However 
Pakistan has retained its “positive list” system (a by-product of its difficult political relations 
with India) which prohibits imports from India of products not on the list. Combined with rules 
(enforced by both countries) against trade across the land border and bureaucratic obstacles to 
trade with Pakistan on the Indian side, bilateral trade – especially of  agricultural products - has 
been emasculated and reduced to very low levels compared with its potential. 
                                                 
8 For a discussion of real exchange rate changes in South Asia after 1980, see World Bank (2004, September, Vol. 
II, Ch. 1).  
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restrictions and drastic tariff reductions. This was possible principally because of the expansion 
of foreign exchange earnings from worker remittances and, in particular, from garment exports. 
However, further trade liberalization stalled and went into reverse from about 1997, with the 
increasing use of para-tariffs on top of customs duties and increased tariff escalation used to 
protect import substitution manufacturing and a number of  agricultural products. 
  In Sri Lanka, from the late 1950s to 1977, under the government’s import substitution 
strategy exchange controls, tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and a formal dual exchange rate system 
after 1968 supported the official exchange rate at increasingly overvalued levels. In 1977 there 
was a major trade policy liberalization which included a nominal devaluation of about 75 
percent, the abolition of the dual exchange rate system, substantial reductions in quantitative 
restrictions and tariff protection of manufacturing and of some agricultural industries. Export 
taxes on plantation crops were reduced during the 1980s and eventually removed in 1992. A 
second wave of trade liberalization started in 1991/92 and continued - albeit erratically and with 
some backtracking - during the 1990s and into the 2000s. As in Bangladesh, this was made 
possible by the rapid and sustained expansion of garment exports, which now account for about 
60 percent of total exports, compared with less than 10 percent before the 1977 reforms. 
Currently Sri Lanka has an open trade policy regime without non-tariff barriers and with 
moderate tariff-based protection of agriculture about equivalent to the tariffs protecting the 
import-competing sections of manufacturing. Within agriculture the most intervention-prone 
products are rice and some other import-competing food products, notably potatoes, onions and 
chillies. Input subsidies for agriculture have also continued, especially very substantial fertilizer 
subsidies.  
 
Regional agricultural trade 
 
A by-product of India’s highly protective agricultural trade policies is that trade in primary and 
processed agricultural and livestock products between India and its South Asian neighbours has 
been badly hindered.
9
                                                 
9 Two exceptions are Bangladesh’s rice imports from India and India’s imports of raw jute from Bangladesh, both of 
which are subject to low tariffs. The the bilateral rice trade was interupted in 2008 as a result of export restrictions 
India imposed on rice in order to insulate its domestic rice market from sharp increases in world rice prices.  
 Ironically, the biggest hindrance has very likely been to Indian exports to 
these countries rather than to Indian imports from the region. However, in Bangladesh and Sri  
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Lanka it also reflects a realistic assessment that agricultural free trade with India would generate 
more agricultural imports from India than exports to India, in the process threatening the 
viability of some of these countries’ more highly protected agricultural industries such as sugar, 
various fresh fruits and vegetables and a wide range of processed foods in Bangladesh, and in Sri 
Lanka, rice, potatoes, onions and possibly dairy products. But bilateral trade between India and 
Pakistan is hostage to their difficult political relationship, which is reflected in Pakistan’s 
“positive list” of products that can be legally imported from India. This list includes almost no 
agricultural products, in addition to which rules enforced in both countries (with a few minor 
exceptions) do not allow trade over the land border.
10
                                                 





Long Run Trends in Assistance to Agriculture 
 
 
The main focus of the present study’s methodology is on government-imposed distortions that 
create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. Since it is not 
possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, 
the project’s methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures 
(including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it also generates estimates of 
distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation. Specifically, Nominal Rates of 
Assistance (NRAs) are computed for farmers including any input subsidies and non-product-
specific forms of assistance or taxation. Also generated is a production-weighted average NRA 
for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the 
calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA – see Anderson et al. 2008).  
Figures 3 to 6 show long run trends during 1965-2005, for the four South Asian country 
case studies, of aggregate NRAs for agriculture, aggregate NRAs for manufacturing (plus mining 
in the case of India), and aggregate RRAs. We comment first on the agricultural sector NRA 
estimates, and then deal with the RRAs which illustrate how incentives for these countries’ 




Nominal rates of assistance 
 
Table 3 shows the agricultural sector products for which there are long term NRA estimates and 
which are included in the country aggregations. At undistorted prices, on average during 2000-
2004, these products accounted for about 70 percent of the total value of Indian agricultural 
production. Following this project’s methodology, the total includes all crops and livestock 
production but excludes fisheries and forestry. At the end of the period fruit and vegetables  
accounted for about one-third of the value of production in the Indian sample, raw milk for about 
one-fifth, paddy 17 percent, wheat 9 percent, and the other 9 crops (sorghum, maize, pulses, four 
different oilseeds, sugar cane and seed cotton) for the remaining 20 percent. In the 1960s and 
early 1970s wheat and rice were more than half the sample and fruit and vegetables about a 
quarter.  
  The Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lankan agricultural sectors are much less diversified 
than India’s, so few products account for large shares of their total agricultural production. Their 
long term NRA estimates include 7 products that accounted for 72 percent, 71 percent, and 64 
percent , respectively, of the total value of production of their agricultural and livestock sectors 
during 2000-05. In Pakistan the dominant product is wheat, followed by milk – together these are 
generally are just under half of total agricultural production and two thirds of Pakistan’s 
aggregate NRA time series. In Bangladesh the dominant product is rice, which is generally 55-60 
percent of the value of agricultural production and has about a three-quarter to four-fifths weight 
in the Bangladesh aggregate NRA time series. The other 5 products in the Bangladesh sample 
(wheat, sugar cane, fresh vegetables-represented by potatoes- jute and tea) together are only 
around 15 percent of agricultural production and have about a 20 percent weight in the aggregate 
NRA series.
11
  Table 2 also indicates the tradable status of the covered products. In the India case study   
over the 40 years, 4 of the 13 products were importable or non tradable, 2 were either exportable 
or non-tradable, and the remaining 7 switched  between importable, exportable and non-traded 
status. However, the Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka country studies have treated all the 
  
                                                 
11 Generalizations from this product sample to Bangladesh’s rural sector as a whole need to be qualified, owing to 
the importance of  fisheries (omitted from this study) in Bangladesh.  
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products included in their long run NRA samples as either importable or exportable over the 
whole period, with the exception of potatoes in Bangladesh (representing fresh vegetables) 
which is classified as non-tradable in every year. These differences in the treatment of tradable 
status in the four country case studies -- and therefore in the way NRAs are estimated -- 
complicate comparisons of their NRAs.
12
Thirdly, in all four countries during most periods NRAs for importables have been 
positive while NRAs for exportables have generally been negative, so that the trade bias indices 
for exportables over the period have mostly been negative and quite high (Table 3). This is 
consistent with the policies followed until the early 1990s whereby export earnings from 
“traditional” agricultural exports were exchanged at overvalued official exchange rates and also 
  
  As well as output price distortions, the aggregate long term NRA series in Figures 3 to 6 
also include the output price equivalent of input subsidies expressed as a percentage of the 
undistorted price. In India these are the sum of fertilizer and electricity subsidies for which 
estimates are available since 1984. They have been allocated to the various crops in the manner 
summarized in Table 4. The Pakistan and Bangladesh NRA estimates include fertilizer subsidies, 
but Sri Lanka’s could not be quantified and allocated to the covered crops.   
There are a number of striking features of the aggregate NRA time series. First, in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh they average close to or just slightly below zero over the whole period, 
albeit with large fluctuations. Sri Lanka is different, with negative average NRAs up to 1993. 
These zero or negative NRAs in each of the four countries are despite pervasive non-tariff 
barriers to imports – especially during the earlier years -- and high tariffs continuing into the 
2000s.  
Secondly, in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh there is practically no trend in the 
agricultural NRAs over the 41 years surveyed, while in Sri Lanka there is a slowly increasing 
trend from about the late 1970s. This is despite a long term, very substantial decline in world 
agricultural prices during the same period.  
                                                 
12 Another difference is that in the India and Pakistan case studies these price comparisons start with estimated fob 
and cif prices at the border, which are adjusted for port costs and domestic transport costs and margins as well to 
give import or export reference prices. However the NRAs reported in the Bangladesh and Sri Lanka studies 
compare domestic prices directly with cif or fob prices without taking account of port or domestic handling costs 




subject to export taxes, and only “non-traditional” exports (in practice manufactures) received 
more favorable exchange rates and/or were eligible for export subsidies of various kinds.  
Fourth, in all four countries the NRAs fluctuate widely around their trend values. These 
fluctuations are mainly due to large gyrations in international prices combined with largely 
succesful efforts by South Asian governments to stabilize domestic prices. For example, in India 
the NRAs were lowest in 1974 when international agricultural  prices were at record highs, and 
highest around 1987 when (in real terms) international agricultural  prices were at record lows. 
For most of the past four decades, as also in 2007-08, export restrictions have generated an 
implicit export tax that has varied substantially as international prices have moved up.  
Fifth, the dispersion of NRAs across the covered products is quite wide in each of the 
countries (Table 3). It is highest in Pakistan and Bangladesh, mainly due to the contrast between 
the high protection of sugar cane in both countries and (pre-1990) of milk in Pakistan, and the 
export taxes and hence negative NRAs of these countries’ exportables. In India NRA dispersion 
is affected by high protection of sugar cane, rape mustard seeds and (until the mid-1990s) of the 
dairying sector (milk). In Sri Lanka the width of the dispersion is mainly due to high protection 
of import substitution potatoes, onions and chillies contrasted with the taxation of agricultural 
exports. No obvious long term trend in dispersion is apparent in India and Bangladesh, but since 
about 1990 previously very high NRA dispersion seems to have come down in Pakistan, and was 
markedly lower in Sri Lanka during 2000-04 than in previous years. 
Sixth, in India there has been a steadily increasing contribution to the NRA for covered 
products from the fertilizer and electricity subsidies. During  2000-04 subsidies contributed 
almost 10 percentage points to an average NRA of 16 percent. The Pakistan country study 
estimates that after 1990 the fertilizer subsidy adds about 3 percentage points to the NRAs for 
wheat, paddy, cotton and sugar cane, and about 7 percentage points before 1990 when non-
nitrogenous fertilizers were also subsidized. The estimated contribution to NRAs in Bangladesh 
appears to be considerably lower however, with only about 1 or 2 percentage points added to the 
wheat and potato NRAs.  
  




The incentives facing farmers depend not only on the agricultural NRAs but also on how trade 
and other price-distorting policies affect incentives facing producers in other tradable sectors. In 
order to see how relative incentives have evolved in the four countries, Figures 3 to 6 compare 
the NRAs for agriculture (the middle line in each graph) with estimates of NRAs for non-
agricultural tradables (the top line). Comparing these gives the relative rate of assistance (RRA), 
which is the percentage difference between the agricultural NRA and the non-agricultural 
NRA,
13
  Despite these shortcomings, the India and Pakistan non-agricultural NRA series are 
broadly consistent with the known history of these countries’ trade policies, including periodic 
devaluations, longer term trends in their real exchange rates, and trade policy liberalization 
episodes. In particular in India the downward trend of India’s non-agricultural NRA from very 
high levels in the 1960s was associated with the long term real Rupee devaluation that started 
 and (except for a few years in India) is the bottom line in each graph. Five year averages 
of each country’s RRAs are shown in Figure 7. 
  The  non-agricultural NRA series for India is a weighted average of estimated NRAs for 
manufacturing and mining. In Pakistan it covers all of tradable non-agriculture (but mainly 
manufacturing), and in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka just manufacturing is covered. The services 
sectors of the four countries are assumed to be non-tradable. Estimating a long term assistance 
rate series for a country’s manufacturing and other tradable sectors would be a major research 
task on its own which could not be undertaken in this project, so the reliability of the estimates 
for these four countries depends on the availability of prior empirical research and the 
plausibility of the short cuts used. In this regard a major problem in South Asia is that tariffs are 
not reliable guides to protection levels – especially for manufacturing -- owing to their often 
prohibitively high levels and to pervasive quantitative trade restrictions in the past. The India 
case study was able to use the results of previous detailed research on trends in implicit 
manufacturing protection plus new estimates for India’s mining sector, but the estimates for the 
other three countries are more problematic, especially the Bangladesh and Sri Lanka estimates 
which rely on inferences from changing tariff levels plus the assumption that the NRAs of 
manufactured exports were zero over the entire period. Consequently the non-agricultural NRA 
series and hence the RRAs are at best rough approximations which could change with further 
research.  
                                                 
13 The RRA is defined as 100*[(100+NRAag)/(100+NRAnonag)-1]   
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with the 1966 devaluation and continued up to 1979, the massive continuing devaluation 
between 1985 and 1992, and the liberalizing trade policy reforms that started slowly during the 
1980s, accelerated in 1991 and continued during the 1990s into the 2000s (figure 1). The 
Pakistan series (figure 4) reflects the sharp Rupee devaluation in 1971 which more than doubled 
Rupee border prices and correspondingly cut estimated implicit protection, the long term real 
devaluation that started in 1981, and the trade liberalization reforms of the 1990s. Non-
agricultural NRAs trended down in Bangladesh (from 1994) and in Sri Lanka (from 1986) and 
this is consistent with the timing of import policy liberalization and both countries’ rapidly 
growing garment export sectors. However, in other respects the connections between these series 
and real exchange rate changes and trade policy developments in these two countries is less 
apparent and could benefit from further research.
14
Subject to these caveats, the South Asian RRAs tell some interesting stories. First, for all  
four countries they are negative in all years except the last four in India, indicating that 
incentives for these countries’ rural sectors have been less than incentives for their non-
agricultural tradable sectors. Secondly, they confirm earlier research which indicated that up to 
the mid-1980s there were very high anti-agricultural biases in the RRAs (here estimated at 
between minus 40 to minus 60 percent) in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and expand this result 
to include Bangladesh where, according to these estimates, there was a similar very high anti-
agricultural bias during the first half of the 1970s and a negative but less marked anti-agricultural 
bias into the mid-1980s. Thirdly, in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka there has been a clear, long 
term decline in anti-agricultural bias: by the first five years of the present decade the Indian RRA 
indicator had turned slightly positive (about plus 10 percent) while the Pakistan and Sri Lankan 
RRA indicators were only mildly negative (about minus 12 percent on average). There are no 
equivalent long run trends in the Bangladesh series. According to these estimates, the anti-
agricultural bias was still very high during the 1990s (between minus 20 and 36  percent), but 
this too came down during 1999 and after to an average of about minus 16 percent. Fourth, in 
India and Pakistan the long run downward trend in non-agricultural NRAs -- especially falling 
manufacturing protection rates -- have been by far the main force squeezing out the anti-
agricultural bias. As discussed above, over the 41 years there was no clear long term upward 
 
                                                 
14 For example the 1977 devaluation and trade policy reforms do not show up in the Sri Lanka series, while the  
Bangladesh NRA series increases during the trade policy reform period in Bangladesh which removed quantitative 
restrictions and cut tariffs during late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.  
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trend in these countries’ agricultural NRAs. The pattern was different  in Sri Lanka, where the 
long term increasing (less negative) trend of the RRAs resulted from both declining 
manufacturing NRAs and increasing (less negative) agricultural NRAs. Finally, the absence of 
any clear long term trend in Bangladesh’s consistently negative RRAs is the result of 
approximately trendless NRAs for both agriculture and manufacturing. The latter is a somewhat 
unexpected result in view of the fairly comprehensive trade policy liberalization that occurred 




Where Are South Asian Policies Heading? 
 
 
During the first five years of the 2000s, the RRA indicators discussed above indicate that with 
the apparent exception of Bangladesh, the past marked anti-agricultural discrimination created by 
the South Asian countries’ trade and other policies had evolved to approximate neutrality 
between their agricultural and non-agricultural traded sectors. What is the likely direction of 
future policies in the region? Since what matters is relative protection or assistance, the answer to 
these questions depends on the probable direction of the trade and trade-related policies affecting 
these countries’ non-agricultural sectors (especially manufacturing but also mining and 
increasingly internationally traded services) and their agricultural sectors. We comment first on 
the likely direction of non-agricultural trade policies, and then on the likely direction of 
agricultural policies.  
   As regards non-agricultural trade policies, protection levels in most of Indian 
manufacturing and also in mining are now constrained by low tariffs. Even in the few industries 
that are still protected by high tariffs – such as textile fabrics, garments and auto assembly – 
growing exports and domestic competition suggest that it is unlikely that prices are likely to rise 
much above world prices in the foreseeable future. India’s large export oriented services sector is 
low cost and highly competitive internationally, and it is improbable that this will change in the 
foreseeable future. In Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, while nearly all manufacturing 
quantitative restrictions have gone, on average tariffs that are protecting import substituting  
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manufacturing are higher than in India. This is especially the case in Bangladesh where, since 
about 1997, the increasing use of para-tariffs on top of customs duties and steep tariff escalation  
have provided very high nominal and effective protection for many import substitution 
industries. On the other hand, these countries have large rapidly growing export industries, 
notably textiles and clothing in Pakistan and clothing (ready made garments) in Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka. These export-oriented industries account for much larger shares of total 
manufacturing GDP than do India’s manufactured exports -- about 40 percent  in Pakistan, and 
probably a quarter to a third in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. As long as the export expansion of 
these industries continues and is not slowed down or blocked by restrictive import policies, 
especially in developed countries, it seems unlikely that overall manufacturing protection will 
increase in the future, at least in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The likely future direction of average 
manufacturing sector NRAs in Bangladesh is less certain, however, in view of the protection 
policies for the import substitution side of the sector that have been in place for the past 10 years. 
If South Asia’s non-agricultural trade policies remain relatively open and do not become 
more protective in the future, how relative assistance for agriculture will develop will principally 
depend on the future path of agricultural protection and subsidy policies. The political economy 
of this question is complex, with some forces and arguments making it likely that a high 
protection path for agriculture will be followed, and others constraining this kind of 
development.  
Politically very important considerations that favor protection over open trade policies 
are the very high share of employment in the South Asian rural sector, the desire to insulate 
farmers from the large price fluctuations that occur in world agricultural markets, and the feeling 
that each country should be self sufficient, or nearly self sufficient, in the production of basic 
foods and other agricultural commodities. This feeling of self-sufficiency is reinforced during 
2007-08 in the wake of surging global food prices, and export bans of staples by some countries. 
In India the argument for self sufficiency, and thereby protection, is further reinforced by the 
widely shared belief that Indian demand is too large to rely on world markets for supplies in the 
event of serious crop failures or other disruptions to supplies. Agricultural protection has an 
ethnic dimension in Sri Lanka, where past agricultural trade liberalization mostly affected Tamil 
farming areas and protection and subsidies favored Sinhalese farmers.   
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In India, the political economy forces enumerated above are the basic reasons for the 
exclusion of agriculture and the food processing industries from the liberalizing trade policy 
reforms in 1991, for the fixing of very high tariff bindings (most at 100 percent or 150 percent) 
during the Uruguay Round negotiations, and for leaving agriculture out of the unilateral tariff 
reduction program that started in 2003. Most of the UR Agreement on Agriculture tariff  
bindings of Pakistan (100 percent) and Bangladesh (200 percent) are also prohibitive or almost 
prohibitive: only Sri Lanka’s bindings (all at 50 percent) seem to envisage limiting increases in 
applied tariffs to levels at which imports might be possible. But average applied agricultural 
tariffs in Pakistan and Sri Lanka (respectively 23 percent and 28 percent in 2003) are well below 
the Indian average of 40 percent in 2005. 
 
On the other side, because of the very high share of food in South Asian family budgets, 
there are strong pressures to keep agricultural prices down. For many years this was a major 
objective of agricultural policies and was compatible with expanding production and increasing 
national self-sufficiency, largely resulting from successful adoption of “green revolution” 
technologies in crop agriculture. There were further benefits to low-income households from 
subsidized rice and wheat supplied through the PDS system in India and the equivalent schemes 
in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.   
There are no organized groups in South Asia representing the interests of food 
consumers, like those that represent farmers and food processors. Nevertheless, in all the South 
Asian countries politicians and bureaucrats are aware of, and sensitive to the consumer interest in 
food prices, especially mass staple products. In this way consumer interests remain important 
counter forces to producer lobbies pressing for higher agricultural prices. However, it appears 
that this is unlikely to provide much resistance to increasing agricultural protection if domestic 
and external conditions create strong producer pressures in that direction. Medium or long term 
scenarios favoring increasing protection could include the following elements: domestic 
production of major crops such as rice and wheat falling behind domestic demand, resulting in 
pressures for price increases and/or increases in input subsidies to maintain self sufficiency; 
falling world prices but domestic prices being maintained or even increasing slowly in real 
terms; real exchange rate appreciation reducing national currency border prices while domestic  
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prices remain about the same or slowly increase; and no or limited progress in reducing 
agricultural protection in developed countries in WTO negotiations.  
Scenarios that might reduce or slow down pressures for increased agricultural protection 
could include a long run trend of increasing and more stable world prices. In this regard the 
medium and long term outcomes of the surge in world agricultural prices during 2007 and 2008 
will be very important. If world prices stabilize at significantly higher levels than past averages, 
the South Asian countries are likely to lower tariffs on agricultural products, and even impose 
export bans (as India has done on common rice, wheat and corn), thereby reintroducing 
substantial anti-agriculural bias into their incentive systems. Other scenarios that might work 
against increased agricultural sector protection include yield and other productivity increases – 
including especially productivity increases in transport, storage and marketing; or successful 
WTO negotiations on the reduction of developed country protection and subsidies (especially 
export subsidies and domestic support) leading to greater willingness in South Asia to consider 
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Figure 1: Real effective exchange rate index, India, 1964 to 2007 
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Figure 2: Unweighted average tariffs on imports of agricultural and non-agricultural goods, 


















2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
All tariff lines 
Agriculuture HS 01-24 
Non-agriculture HS 25-99 
2002 and 2003 include para-tariffs which were abolished in 2004.  
Averages are of ad-valorem tariffs only and do not take account of  
the specific components of compound duties  
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Figure 3: NRA agriculture, NRA manufacturing and mining, and RRA agriculture,











t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. The 1965-69 manufacturing and 
mining NRAs are guesstimates. 
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a The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined in the note to Figure 3. 
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a The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined in the note to Figure 3. 
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a The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined in the note to Figure 3. 
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a The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined in the note to Figure 3. 
 
Source: From Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on the country case study spreadsheets  



















Sri Lanka  
   




  1965-69  1975-79  1985-89  2000-04 
Share of GDP          
India  44  36  29  21 
Pakistan  35  29  24  22 
Bangladesh   n.a.  55  31  22 
Sri Lanka   29  28  24  17 
South Asia  
(4-country sample)  43  36  29  21 
Share of employment         
India  73  70  66  59 
Pakistan  65  64  55  46 
Bangladesh   n.a.  76  67  54 
Sri Lanka   55  53  49  45 
South Asia  
(4-country sample)  74  70  65  57 
aAggregates for South Asia exclude Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, which together account 
for about 1.5% of South Asian agricultural GDP. Separate data not available for Bangladesh 
before it separated from Pakistan in 1971. 
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007). Compiled from the World Bank's World 
Development  Indicators and FAOSTAT.  
   






   Percent of  Subsidy as  percent of  gross value 
   total subsidy  of production at: 
      Domestic  Reference 
      price  price 
           
Rice  37.1  18.3  15.4 
Wheat  35.2  27.2  18.9 
Maize  2.1  9.3  8.8 
Sorghum  1.8  12.4  11.5 
Chickpea  2.7  11.4  10.9 
Groundnut  2.7  8.4  5.7 
Rape/mustard seed  4.5  11.7  18.0 
Soybean  1.1  4.3  2.9 
Sunflower seed  0.5  8.8  8.6 
Sugar   6.6  12.5  15.4 
Cotton  5.6  13.2  12.3 
Total: 11 crops  100.0  16.9  13.0 
 
a The total value of the input subsidies for these 11 crops this year was $US7.8 billion ($1.9 
billion for fertilizer and $5.9 billion for electricity). 
 
Source: Pursell, Gulati and Gupta (2009). 
 
  
   
Table 3: Trade status of farm commodities, South Asian countries,
a 1965 to 2005 
 
   India  Pakistan  Bangladesh 
Sri 
Lanka 
           
Common rice/paddy  X/NT  X  M  M 
Basmati rice/paddy    X      
Wheat  M/X/NT  M  M    
Maize   M/X/NT  M      
Sorghum  M/X/NT        
Pulses (chickpeas)  M/NT        
Groundnuts  M/X/NT        
Rape/mustard seeds  M/NT        
Soya beans  M/X/NT        
Sunflower seeds  M/NT        
Sugar/sugar cane  M/X/NT  M  M    
Cotton lint/seed cotton  M/X/NT  X      
Jute      X    
Tea       X  X 
Rubber        X 
Coconut/coconut products        X 
Chillies        M 
Potatoes      NT  M 
Onions        M 
6 fresh fruits & 7  vegetables  X/NT        
Processed & raw  milk  M/NT  M      
           
% coverage 2000-04 or 2000-05  70  72  71  64 
 
a M, X and NT indicates whether the product was classified as an importable, exportable or as a 
non-traded tradable. In Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka all the covered products were 
classified as M or X for the entire period (except for Bangladesh potatoes which is classified 
NT and is asumed to represent all vegetables). The India study recognized that tradable status 
can  change from year to year depending on the location of domestic prices with respect to 
import and export parity prices, so for example M/X/NT  means that wheat was importable in 
some years, exportable in some years, and non-traded in others. The Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
country studies do not allow for the port and domestic handling costs of imports and exports 
and compare domestic prices directly with cif or fob prices. Blank cells mean that a long term 
NRA series is not available for that product. The coverage percentages are the share of the total 
value of the output of the covered products in the country's total agricultural output, both 
measured at undistorted prices. The total value of agricultural output is at farm level and 
excludes fisheries and forestry activities. Including fisheries in total agricultural production 
would substantially reduce the Bangladesh coverage percentage. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on the country case study spreadsheets  
  
   
Table 4: NRAs, trade bias indices
a and dispersion of covered farm products,
a South Asia, 
1965 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
India                 
NRA importables  41  53  74  59  82  38  23  34 
NRA exportables  -30  -22  -36  -28  -7  -15  -12  -6 
NRA total agriculture  0  0  -6  2  25  2  1  16 
Trade bias index  -0.51  -0.50  -0.63  -0.55  -0.48  -0.38  -0.28  -0.29 
Dispersion (13 products)   42.8  17.8  6.5  18.8  49.0  46.6  12.5  24.1 
Pakistan                 
NRA importables  45  19  -4  -2  5  -8  -2  3 
NRA exportables  -35  -20  -33  -29  -32  -17  -4  -7 
NRA total agriculture  15  7  -8  -6  -4  -7  -2  1 
Trade bias index  -0.55  -0.27  -0.31  -0.28  -0.35  -0.10  -0.02  -0.09 
Dispersion (7 products)   105.6  74.5  43.2  49.6  65.2  32.2  27.7  39.5 
Bangladesh                 
NRA importables  n.a  -21  7  -2  24  0  -8  6 
NRA exportables  n.a  -29  -35  -26  -32  -33  -10  -33 
NRA total agriculture  n.a  -21  3  -4  17  -2  -8  4 
Trade bias index  n.a  -0.10  -0.30  -0.23  -0.45  -0.33  0.00  -0.37 
Dispersion (6 products)   n.a  52.1  71.4  67.6  190.7  77.5  67.9  101.2 
Sri Lanka                 
NRA importables  -6  9  -4  -1  -2  22  32  13 
NRA exportables  -39  -41  -45  -31  -21  -24  -2  6 
NRA total agriculture  -25  -16  -26  -14  -10  -1  12  9 
Trade bias index  -0.35  -0.45  -0.43  -0.31  -0.18  -0.38  -0.25  -0.05 
Dispersion (7products)  20.9  31.9  24.7  22.8  22.4  25  20.8  12.6 
 
a The Pakistan statistics in the last column are the averages for 2000-05. The statistics for 
Bangladesh in the 1970-74 column are for 1974 only. The NRA for total agriculture include 
guesstimates of the average NRA of the non-covered section of the agricultural sector (which 
are not based on explicit price comparisons). Because of differences in the way importables 
and exportables are defined the NRAs and trade bias indices (TBIs) for India cannot be 
compared with the TBIs for the other countries (see notes to Table 3).  
b The trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and 
NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts of 
the agricultural sector. 
c Dispersion of the NRAs of the covered products (including products classified as non-
traded) is the simple 5 year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted 
mean NRA of all covered  products (i.e. importables, exportables and non-tradeds). 
 
Source: From Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on the country case study spreadsheets  
  




This Appendix summarizes the annual estimates, for each of the four focus South Asian 
countries, of key distortion indicators defined in Anderson et al. (2008). Four tables are 
provided for each country: (a) the Nominal Rate of Assistance to individual farm products 
covered in the study and their weighted average, using as weights production valued at 
undistorted prices; (b) the Relative Rate of Assistance to producers of agricultural (relative to 
non-agricultural) tradables, again using as weights production valued at undistorted prices, 
and the component parts of the RRA calculation; (c) the weights themselves for individual 
covered farm products and for the residual non-covered group of products, shown as 
percentages and so they sum to 100 percent; and (d) the trade status of each covered product 
each year. 
  The Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) in the case of a product having just its output 
price distorted by government policies is the percentage by which the domestic producer 
price exceeds the price that would prevail under free markets, that is, the border price 
appropriately adjusted to account for differences in product quality, transport costs, 
processing costs, etc. A negative value indicates the domestic price is below that comparable 
border price. If producers of that product also are affected by distortions to product-specific 
input prices, their ad valorem equivalent is accounted for by subtracting the ad valorem input 
price distortion times its input-output coefficient from the farm industry’s output NRA to get 
the total nominal rate of assistance to production of that farm product. 





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
The sources of these tables are the previously cited Working Paper versions of the South 
Asian chapters in Anderson and Martin (2009), each of which is downloadable in the 
Working Paper section of the project’s website, www.worldbank.org/agdistortions. Also 
available at that website is the complete global distortions database (Anderson and 
Valenzuela 2008) and the other regional papers to appear in Anderson (2009). The references 
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Appendix Table 1: Annual distortion estimates, Bangladesh, 1974 to 2004 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products 
(percent) 
   Jute  Potato  Rice  Sugar  Tea  Wheat 
All 
covered  
1974  -30  1  -26  74  1  39  -21 
1975  -53  1  105  -9  -4  140  78 
1976  -33  2  -5  -19  -14  -6  -8 
1977  -43  2  -26  65  -14  18  -23 
1978  -38  2  -28  209  -23  9  -24 
1979  -19  2  -13  213  -17  -9  -10 
1980  -30  0  -12  137  -24  1  -10 
1981  -40  1  -36  -13  -14  -19  -33 
1982  -37  1  5  56  -5  -11  4 
1983  -17  2  3  270  -9  -1  6 
1984  -22  2  14  236  -2  1  14 
1985  -21  2  39  715  -12  7  32 
1986  -54  2  8  688  -59  14  2 
1987  -44  1  42  338  -8  24  38 
1988  -20  2  12  298  -9  16  10 
1989  -38  2  1  140  -12  -5  2 
1990  -28  3  -4  124  0  3  -1 
1991  -33  3  2  137  -14  32  4 
1992  -42  2  -2  194  -12  5  0 
1993  -46  0  -11  205  -13  -3  -7 
1994  -44  2  -12  171  -21  -14  -8 
1995  -29  3  -1  124  -33  6  2 
1996  15  3  -19  111  -18  -14  -14 
1997  -3  3  -24  131  -21  -4  -17 
1998  21  3  -15  138  -5  9  -11 
1999  -32  2  -1  192  -26  16  2 
2000  -37  1  2  308  -16  19  5 
2001  -41  2  9  180  -18  -1  9 
2002  -29  2  3  149  -27  -5  4 
2003  -40  2  6  271  -22  -15  6 
2004  -46  2  -8  212  -19  1  -5 
  
   
Appendix Table 1 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Bangladesh, 1974 to 2004  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries 
   (percent) 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1974  1  -21  0  -16  -29  -21  -22  46  -46 
1975  0  78  0  57  -48  93  82  29  42 
1976  1  -9  0  -6  -32  -6  -8  27  -27 
1977  1  -24  0  -18  -39  -22  -23  28  -40 
1978  1  -25  0  -19  -36  -24  -25  29  -42 
1979  2  -11  0  -7  -19  -9  -10  30  -31 
1980  1  -11  0  -7  -29  -8  -10  18  -24 
1981  1  -34  0  -27  -36  -34  -34  24  -47 
1982  1  3  0  3  -32  7  4  22  -15 
1983  1  5  0  5  -16  8  6  23  -13 
1984  1  13  0  11  -17  18  15  25  -8 
1985  1  31  0  22  -19  43  33  25  7 
1986  1  2  0  2  -55  16  2  29  -21 
1987  1  37  0  26  -37  47  40  33  5 
1988  1  8  0  7  -18  13  10  29  -15 
1989  2  -1  0  1  -33  4  2  26  -20 
1990  2  -3  0  0  -23  1  -1  29  -23 
1991  2  3  0  3  -30  7  4  32  -21 
1992  1  -1  0  0  -36  3  0  35  -26 
1993  0  -8  0  -5  -39  -5  -8  32  -30 
1994  1  -9  0  -5  -37  -6  -8  39  -34 
1995  2  -1  0  1  -30  4  2  29  -21 
1996  2  -16  0  -9  5  -15  -14  30  -34 
1997  3  -19  0  -11  -8  -18  -17  30  -36 
1998  2  -13  0  -8  13  -13  -12  32  -33 
1999  2  0  0  1  -30  4  2  25  -18 
2000  2  3  0  4  -31  8  6  25  -16 
2001  2  7  0  6  -34  12  9  25  -12 
2002  3  1  0  3  -28  6  4  21  -14 
2003  3  3  0  5  -35  9  7  26  -15 
2004  3  -8  0  -4  -37  -4  -6  20  -21 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.   
   
Appendix Table 1 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Bangladesh, 1974 to 2004 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   Jute  Potato  Rice  Sugar  Tea  Wheat 
Non-
covered  
1974  9  3  61  3  0  1  23 
1975  5  4  57  7  0  0  27 
1976  5  3  64  5  1  1  22 
1977  7  2  67  3  1  1  19 
1978  6  2  68  1  1  1  21 
1979  8  2  60  1  1  1  26 
1980  6  2  63  1  1  2  25 
1981  4  2  69  4  1  3  18 
1982  5  3  62  4  1  4  22 
1983  5  2  64  1  1  4  22 
1984  5  3  61  1  2  4  25 
1985  9  3  52  1  2  4  29 
1986  11  2  52  1  2  3  29 
1987  4  3  54  1  1  3  33 
1988  5  3  62  0  1  3  26 
1989  4  3  63  2  1  3  24 
1990  4  3  62  2  1  2  27 
1991  5  2  60  2  1  2  27 
1992  4  3  61  2  1  3  27 
1993  3  3  58  2  1  3  30 
1994  3  4  56  2  1  3  31 
1995  3  3  58  2  1  3  30 
1996  2  3  58  2  1  4  31 
1997  3  3  56  2  1  4  32 
1998  3  3  59  0  1  5  29 
1999  2  5  58  1  1  4  29 
2000  2  7  57  1  1  4  29 
2001  3  4  56  1  1  4  30 
2002  3  4  58  1  1  4  28 
2003  2  6  58  1  1  3  28 
2004  2  7  61  1  1  3  26 
a At farmgate undistorted prices  
   
Appendix Table 1 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Bangladesh, 1974 to 2004  
(d) Trade status
a of covered
 products  
 
   Jute  Potato  Rice  Sugar  Tea  Wheat 
1974  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1975  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1976  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1977  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1978  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1979  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1980  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1981  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1982  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1983  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1984  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1985  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1986  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1987  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1988  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1989  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1990  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1991  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1992  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1993  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1994  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1995  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1996  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1997  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1998  X  H  M  M  X  M 
1999  X  H  M  M  X  M 
2000  X  H  M  M  X  M 
2001  X  H  M  M  X  M 
2002  X  H  M  M  X  M 
2003  X  H  M  M  X  M 
2004  X  H  M  M  X  M 
 
a Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on Ahmed, Bakht, Dorosh and Shahabuddin 
(2007)  
   
Appendix Table 2: Annual distortion estimates, India, 1965 to 2004 




































1965  5  33  0  54  85  na  66  0  46  na  171  na  47  21 
1966  4  6  0  24  81  na  40  -34  25  na  181  na  11  -2 
1967  39  16  0  6  59  na  83  -37  65  na  126  na  19  -5 
1968  0  0  0  16  36  na  64  -44  12  na  224  na  42  -13 
1969  75  34  0  18  57  na  62  -35  60  na  90  na  39  0 
1970  0  85  0  0  23  na  56  -16  35  na  52  na  58  8 
1971  0  90  0  0  34  na  65  0  97  na  29  na  53  17 
1972  0  122  0  8  106  na  72  0  39  na  59  na  41  19 
1973  0  107  0  0  55  na  0  -34  48  0  0  na  0  -6 
1974  7  -12  0  0  28  na  1  -67  56  0  -51  na  0  -36 
1975  0  0  0  -31  -31  130  0  -58  0  -16  -69  0  0  -29 
1976  0  30  0  -14  0  171  0  -36  0  -14  -16  0  -3  -1 
1977  0  0  0  -21  20  176  27  -29  45  -6  8  0  18  5 
1978  0  15  0  -18  24  137  34  -43  8  -28  30  0  0  -6 
1979  0  0  0  0  0  149  22  -29  5  -10  0  0  0  3 
1980  26  8  0  0  0  93  50  -45  0  0  -24  1  0  -9 
1981  9  -9  0  25  0  68  46  -54  16  0  -18  3  -2  -15 
1982  0  9  0  35  4  97  34  -30  10  0  25  28  0  6 
1983  0  8  0  21  9  146  47  -13  4  0  21  0  0  13 
1984  3  -14  0  28  -20  164  15  -13  2  -6  44  7  11  15 
1985  34  6  0  41  4  186  12  6  24  9  93  52  12  29 
1986  3  34  0  95  10  192  60  4  66  35  76  117  8  32 
1987  5  90  0  124  86  178  136  8  56  44  68  65  14  43 
1988  12  25  0  18  33  79  113  -21  19  5  37  5  18  14 
1989  7  14  0  31  -1  49  53  -16  13  4  6  40  -6  8 
1990  15  10  0  39  8  91  113  -18  6  5  6  45  29  16 
1991  9  1  -17  36  11  48  77  -27  7  4  8  32  -5  0 
1992  9  6  -32  4  -15  16  48  -30  -3  3  7  4  -9  -12 
1993  6  31  -17  4  3  24  49  -13  -25  1  8  4  17  1 
1994  7  65  -13  6  9  23  37  -17  51  3  8  5  21  4 
1995  16  -6  -21  7  11  0  22  -9  2  4  -5  7  -13  -7 
1996  11  -6  -9  6  -5  21  19  -31  9  3  9  11  -15  -7 
1997  24  12  -17  8  -12  20  21  -21  13  0  11  10  35  -2 
1998  10  14  -2  6  8  26  67  0  33  3  10  18  34  11 
1999  14  16  -19  12  11  44  56  -5  50  5  37  21  31  8 
2000  18  22  -13  13  12  14  53  15  13  7  29  17  38  9 
2001  35  -1  0  11  12  31  36  18  16  7  9  19  36  17 
2002  16  7  -5  17  16  59  72  29  16  10  44  16  47  26 
2003  11  17  -14  15  9  40  89  19  15  -2  51  11  34  16 
2004  13  15  -13  9  10  17  75  22  18  -8  63  10  37  11  
   
Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, India, 1965 to 2004  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries 
(percent) 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1965  0  21  20  20  na  55  54  113
 d
  -56 
1966  0  -2  -3  -2  -34  33  -4  113
 d
  -55 
1967  0  -5  -5  -5  -37  35  -6  113
 d
  -56 
1968  0  -13  -13  -13  -44  39  -17  113
 d
  -61 
1969  0  0  0  0  -35  46  0  113
 d
  -53 
1970  0  8  8  8  -16  53  12  79  -37 
1971  0  17  17  17  0  61  61  85  -13 
1972  0  19  19  19  0  53  53  81  -16 
1973  0  -6  -6  -6  -34  73  -13  83  -52 
1974  0  -36  -36  -36  -61  24  -50  87  -73 
1975  0  -29  -28  -28  -57  77  -39  66  -64 
1976  0  -1  -1  -1  -25  110  -2  57  -38 
1977  0  5  5  5  -28  58  6  64  -35 
1978  0  -6  -6  -6  -40  59  -9  61  -43 
1979  0  3  3  3  -29  69  7  76  -39 
1980  0  -9  -9  -9  -43  57  -15  82  -53 
1981  0  -15  -15  -15  -39  42  -18  63  -50 
1982  0  6  5  6  -30  46  9  54  -29 
1983  0  13  13  13  -13  54  21  56  -22 
1984  3  11  15  15  -14  95  23  42  -13 
1985  5  24  29  29  4  99  85  49  25 
1986  3  29  32  32  0  102  102  52  32 
1987  5  38  43  43  0  122  123  59  40 
1988  5  9  14  14  -21  49  18  46  -19 
1989  5  3  8  8  -13  35  10  37  -20 
1990  7  9  16  16  -14  72  21  35  -11 
1991  5  -5  0  0  -19  42  -1  13  -12 
1992  5  -17  -12  -12  -25  19  -15  2  -16 
1993  5  -4  1  1  -10  27  0  11  -9 
1994  7  -2  4  4  -9  31  4  19  -13 
1995  7  -14  -7  -7  -13  2  -9  19  -24 
1996  6  -13  -7  -7  -19  21  -9  15  -22 
1997  7  -9  -2  -2  -18  20  -7  11  -16 
1998  8  3  11  11  0  26  9  10  -1 
1999  8  0  8  8  -12  44  5  8  -2 
2000  9  1  9  9  -2  18  7  4  3 
2001  10  7  17  17  -1  31  29  0  28 
2002  12  14  26  26  -4  55  24  4  19 
2003  9  7  16  16  -13  42  12  13  -1 
2004  9  2  11  11  -12  25  5  na  na 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
d. NRAs to nonagriculture are not estimated, but based on authors’ assumptions  
   
Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, India, 1965 to 2004  
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered







































1965  3  3  15  4  2  na  1  21  3  na  2  na  4  43 
1966  2  3  13  3  2  na  1  22  3  na  2  na  4  45 
1967  3  3  13  3  2  na  1  28  3  na  1  na  6  39 
1968  2  3  12  3  1  na  1  30  3  na  1  na  5  39 
1969  2  3  16  4  1  na  1  26  2  na  2  na  6  38 
1970  3  2  15  5  2  na  1  24  3  na  2  na  7  37 
1971  3  3  16  5  2  na  1  22  2  na  2  na  8  36 
1972  3  3  18  4  1  na  1  19  2  na  2  na  7  38 
1973  2  2  13  5  1  na  1  24  2  0  3  na  5  40 
1974  2  3  9  3  1  na  1  32  2  0  3  na  5  39 
1975  2  2  8  3  2  4  1  31  2  0  7  0  6  32 
1976  2  3  13  4  2  5  1  23  3  0  3  0  8  33 
1977  2  4  13  5  1  5  1  25  3  0  3  0  7  31 
1978  2  3  12  4  1  5  1  29  2  0  2  0  8  30 
1979  1  4  14  4  1  5  1  21  3  0  3  0  8  34 
1980  2  3  12  3  1  6  1  25  2  0  3  0  7  35 
1981  2  3  11  3  1  7  1  28  2  0  4  0  6  32 
1982  2  3  14  2  1  7  1  20  2  0  4  0  9  34 
1983  2  3  14  4  1  6  1  20  3  0  3  0  9  34 
1984  2  4  16  3  2  6  2  19  2  0  2  0  8  33 
1985  3  3  19  2  1  7  1  19  2  0  2  0  9  31 
1986  2  2  22  2  2  7  1  18  1  0  2  0  9  32 
1987  2  3  20  2  1  8  1  15  2  1  3  0  8  34 
1988  2  2  15  3  1  9  1  19  2  1  3  0  6  33 
1989  2  3  14  3  1  12  1  19  2  1  4  0  7  31 
1990  2  3  15  3  1  9  1  20  2  1  5  1  6  30 
1991  1  3  15  2  1  11  1  19  1  1  4  0  6  32 
1992  1  2  17  3  1  12  1  18  1  1  4  0  6  32 
1993  2  3  16  3  1  13  1  18  2  1  3  0  6  30 
1994  2  3  16  3  1  14  2  19  1  2  3  1  7  27 
1995  1  3  17  2  1  16  2  14  1  1  5  0  7  29 
1996  1  3  15  2  1  13  2  19  1  2  4  0  7  30 
1997  2  3  21  2  1  14  1  19  1  2  4  0  6  26 
1998  2  3  20  3  1  15  1  17  1  1  3  0  6  27 
1999  1  2  22  1  1  13  1  18  1  1  3  0  7  29 
2000  1  2  22  1  1  18  1  13  1  1  4  0  6  29 
2001  2  2  20  2  1  16  1  14  1  1  5  0  7  29 
2002  1  1  23  1  1  16  1  11  1  1  4  0  7  32 
2003  2  2  23  2  1  15  1  11  1  2  3  0  6  31 
2004  1  2  22  2  1  17  1  10  1  2  2  0  6  31 
a At farmgate undistorted prices  
   
Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, India, 1965 to 2004:  
(d) Trade status
a of covered




































1965  M  M  H  M  M  na  M  H  M  na  M  na  M 
1966  M  M  H  M  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  na  M 
1967  M  M  H  M  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  na  M 
1968  H  H  H  M  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  na  M 
1969  M  M  H  M  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  na  M 
1970  H  M  H  H  M  na  M  X  M  na  M  na  M 
1971  H  M  H  H  M  na  M  H  M  na  M  na  M 
1972  H  M  H  M  M  na  M  H  M  na  M  na  M 
1973  H  M  H  H  M  na  H  X  M  H  H  na  H 
1974  M  X  H  H  M  na  M  X  M  H  X  na  H 
1975  H  H  H  X  X  M  H  X  M  X  X  H  H 
1976  H  M  H  X  H  M  H  X  H  X  X  H  X 
1977  H  H  H  X  M  M  M  X  M  X  M  H  M 
1978  H  M  H  X  M  M  M  X  M  X  M  H  H 
1979  H  H  H  H  H  M  M  X  M  X  M  H  H 
1980  M  M  H  H  H  M  M  X  H  H  X  M  H 
1981  M  X  H  M  H  M  M  X  M  H  X  M  X 
1982  H  M  H  M  M  M  M  X  M  H  M  M  H 
1983  H  M  H  M  M  M  M  X  M  X  M  H  H 
1984  H  X  H  M  X  M  M  X  H  X  M  H  H 
1985  M  X  H  M  H  M  M  H  M  H  M  M  H 
1986  M  M  H  M  M  M  M  H  M  M  M  M  H 
1987  H  M  H  M  M  M  M  H  M  M  M  M  H 
1988  M  M  H  M  M  M  M  X  M  H  M  H  H 
1989  M  M  H  M  X  M  M  X  M  H  H  M  X 
1990  M  H  H  M  H  M  M  X  H  H  X  M  H 
1991  H  X  X  M  M  M  M  X  H  M  H  M  X 
1992  H  X  X  H  X  M  M  X  X  H  H  H  X 
1993  H  M  X  H  X  M  M  X  X  X  H  H  X 
1994  H  M  X  H  H  M  M  X  M  H  H  M  X 
1995  H  X  X  H  H  M  M  X  X  H  X  H  X 
1996  H  X  X  H  X  M  M  X  H  H  H  H  X 
1997  M  H  X  H  X  M  M  X  H  X  H  H  H 
1998  H  H  X  H  X  M  M  X  M  X  M  H  H 
1999  H  H  X  H  H  M  M  X  M  X  M  H  H 
2000  H  H  X  H  H  M  M  X  H  H  M  H  H 
2001  M  X  H  H  H  M  M  H  H  H  H  H  H 
2002  H  X  X  M  H  M  M  H  H  H  M  H  H 
2003  H  H  X  M  H  M  M  H  H  X  M  H  H 
2004  H  H  X  H  H  M  M  H  M  X  M  H  H 
 
a Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on Pursell, Gulati and Gupta (2007)  
   
Appendix Table 3: Annual distortion estimates, Pakistan, 1962 to 2005 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products 
(percent) 
   Cotton  Maize  Milk  Rice  Sugar  Wheat 
All 
covered  
1962  -22  -17  na  -52  193  -7  7 
1963  -17  -16  na  -42  191  -16  6 
1964  -18  -27  na  -45  27  -17  -16 
1965  -3  -14  63  -42  84  6  15 
1966  -19  -26  63  -42  266  -11  17 
1967  -24  -4  60  -53  228  31  24 
1968  -19  6  81  -53  296  18  22 
1969  -23  -11  85  -31  296  12  29 
1970  -11  -11  140  -14  199  19  45 
1971  9  -21  143  2  140  19  47 
1972  1  19  241  6  192  7  42 
1973  -8  -41  26  -62  11  -69  -48 
1974  -22  -44  70  -68  25  -57  -38 
1975  -2  -11  67  -59  -35  -14  -19 
1976  -8  -24  18  -46  -18  -13  -15 
1977  -40  -32  38  -20  26  -26  -11 
1978  2  -8  43  -36  92  -23  -4 
1979  22  9  108  -44  102  -29  -11 
1980  -8  -14  59  -48  63  -36  -20 
1981  -17  -19  68  -46  -14  -30  -22 
1982  32  18  47  -34  61  -2  7 
1983  -5  5  14  -34  123  -21  -8 
1984  14  -20  49  -34  129  -23  -4 
1985  -20  -20  46  -42  178  -18  -6 
1986  4  -22  43  -51  155  -15  -5 
1987  24  -10  45  -40  115  -24  -1 
1988  -18  43  78  -40  124  -18  0 
1989  -20  14  59  -47  45  -33  -16 
1990  -43  -23  15  -46  21  -46  -32 
1991  -31  -9  22  -9  21  -26  -13 
1992  -17  15  22  -5  78  -17  -2 
1993  -1  11  44  3  85  -23  0 
1994  -8  -6  24  -3  56  -23  -4 
1995  -18  3  25  1  33  -19  -5 
1996  -13  2  24  2  43  -32  -7 
1997  -6  -21  1  -2  75  -35  -14 
1998  -4  0  9  9  51  -13  1 
1999  1  7  25  -1  70  -2  12 
2000  17  8  26  -15  145  9  17 
2001  5  -15  14  -11  107  -15  1 
2002  18  -17  4  -13  62  -27  -7 
2003  -2  -12  44  -13  82  -29  -2 
2004  3  -15  18  -18  51  -13  -1 
2005  0  -13  13  -21  73  -9  -2 
  
   
Appendix Table 3 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Pakistan, 1962 to 2005  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries 
        (percent) 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1962  -4  11  0  5  -36  20  7  164  -59 
1963  -5  11  0  4  -27  15  6  175  -61 
1964  -4  -13  0  -11  -36  -8  -16  185  -71 
1965  -1  17  0  11  -30  31  15  227  -65 
1966  -1  18  0  12  -33  38  17  199  -61 
1967  -2  26  0  17  -43  53  24  214  -61 
1968  -5  28  0  16  -43  48  22  232  -63 
1969  -1  31  0  22  -28  55  29  250  -63 
1970  -2  47  0  33  -13  64  45  236  -57 
1971  -6  53  0  35  5  59  47  261  -59 
1972  -13  54  0  30  3  56  42  153  -44 
1973  5  -54  0  -36  -43  -49  -48  51  -66 
1974  7  -45  0  -29  -53  -33  -38  33  -54 
1975  7  -26  0  -14  -46  -8  -19  25  -35 
1976  5  -20  0  -11  -35  -9  -15  44  -41 
1977  2  -13  0  -8  -29  -6  -11  53  -42 
1978  3  -7  0  -3  -25  3  -4  47  -35 
1979  5  -16  0  -7  -32  -2  -11  51  -41 
1980  4  -24  0  -14  -37  -14  -20  55  -49 
1981  5  -27  0  -15  -38  -16  -22  55  -50 
1982  4  3  0  5  -20  18  7  45  -26 
1983  2  -10  0  -5  -26  -1  -8  41  -35 
1984  2  -5  0  -2  -24  4  -4  46  -34 
1985  4  -10  0  -4  -35  6  -6  45  -35 
1986  3  -8  0  -3  -35  7  -5  50  -37 
1987  2  -4  0  -1  -22  6  -1  46  -32 
1988  3  -3  0  0  -31  16  0  41  -30 
1989  3  -19  0  -11  -37  -8  -16  44  -42 
1990  2  -34  0  -22  -45  -28  -32  48  -54 
1991  2  -15  0  -9  -22  -10  -13  41  -38 
1992  3  -5  0  -1  -12  2  -2  38  -29 
1993  2  -2  0  0  1  0  0  34  -25 
1994  2  -6  0  -3  -5  -4  -4  35  -29 
1995  2  -7  0  -3  -12  -3  -5  34  -29 
1996  3  -10  0  -5  -7  -7  -7  32  -29 
1997  2  -16  0  -10  -4  -16  -14  26  -32 
1998  2  -1  0  1  2  1  1  24  -19 
1999  1  12  0  9  0  16  12  19  -5 
2000  1  16  0  12  -5  23  17  17  0 
2001  2  -1  0  1  -3  2  1  15  -12 
2002  1  -9  0  -5  -1  -9  -7  11  -16 
2003  1  -3  0  -2  -9  0  -2  15  -15 
2004  1  -2  0  -1  -10  2  -1  15  -14 
2005  2  -4  0  -1  -14  2  -2  14  -14 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.   
   
Appendix Table 3 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Pakistan, 1962 to 2005 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   Cotton  Maize  Milk  Rice  Sugar  Wheat 
Non-
covered  
1962  9  4  na  8  7  42  31 
1963  8  4  na  6  8  43  31 
1964  7  4  na  14  11  34  31 
1965  6  3  12  12  8  28  31 
1966  7  3  14  12  5  27  31 
1967  7  5  12  14  4  27  30 
1968  6  3  10  14  3  33  30 
1969  8  3  12  15  5  31  27 
1970  8  3  10  11  7  35  26 
1971  8  4  12  9  9  34  26 
1972  10  3  7  9  5  39  27 
1973  4  2  7  8  6  47  25 
1974  7  2  6  14  6  40  26 
1975  4  2  7  16  13  30  27 
1976  4  2  11  12  13  30  28 
1977  7  3  11  10  9  34  27 
1978  5  2  10  13  6  35  29 
1979  4  2  5  16  4  39  30 
1980  5  2  6  14  5  38  30 
1981  5  2  5  13  12  32  31 
1982  4  2  8  16  8  30  31 
1983  5  2  9  13  4  34  31 
1984  4  2  8  14  5  33  33 
1985  6  2  9  14  3  33  33 
1986  5  2  9  14  3  33  33 
1987  5  2  10  13  6  32  32 
1988  10  2  9  14  4  31  30 
1989  7  2  8  12  5  34  32 
1990  9  2  9  10  5  33  33 
1991  11  2  11  7  6  33  29 
1992  11  2  11  6  4  31  35 
1993  7  2  10  6  4  35  36 
1994  7  2  12  7  5  31  36 
1995  11  2  10  5  5  30  36 
1996  9  2  16  5  4  29  36 
1997  7  2  19  6  3  32  30 
1998  6  2  19  5  6  31  30 
1999  7  2  20  9  6  28  29 
2000  5  2  20  11  3  31  27 
2001  7  2  19  7  3  33  28 
2002  5  2  19  8  5  32  29 
2003  6  2  14  10  5  34  30 
2004  7  2  16  11  5  30  30 
2005  6  3  16  11  3  31  30 
a At farmgate undistorted prices  
   
Appendix Table 3 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Pakistan, 1962 to 2005:  
(d) Trade status
a of covered
 products  
 
   Cotton  Maize  Milk  Rice  Sugar  Wheat 
1962  X  M  na  X  M  M 
1963  X  M  na  X  M  M 
1964  X  M  na  X  M  M 
1965  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1966  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1967  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1968  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1969  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1970  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1971  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1972  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1973  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1974  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1975  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1976  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1977  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1978  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1979  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1980  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1981  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1982  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1983  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1984  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1985  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1986  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1987  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1988  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1989  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1990  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1991  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1992  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1993  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1994  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1995  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1996  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1997  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1998  X  M  M  X  M  M 
1999  X  M  M  X  M  M 
2000  X  M  M  X  M  M 
2001  X  M  M  X  M  M 
2002  X  M  M  X  M  M 
2003  X  M  M  X  M  M 
2004  X  M  M  X  M  M 
2005  X  M  M  X  M  M 
 
a Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on Dorosh and Salem (2007)  
   
Appendix Table 4: Annual distortion estimates, Sri Lanka, 1955 to 2004 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products  (percent) 
   Chillies  Coconut  Onion  Potato  Rice  Rubber  Tea 
All 
covered  
1955  na  -35  na  na  42  -18.0  -23  -14 
1956  na  -24  na  na  51  -3.6  -18  -8 
1957  na  -28  na  na  70  -19.0  -23  -10 
1958  na  -29  na  na  95  -24.9  -25  -9 
1959  na  -28  na  na  54  -13.5  -22  -11 
1960  na  -32  na  na  42  -38.5  -32  -21 
1961  na  -37  na  na  32  -45.6  -35  -26 
1962  na  -23  na  na  -7  -53  -40  -31 
1963  na  -26  na  na  4  -59  -44  -34 
1964  na  -30  na  na  -11  -62  -46  -38 
1965  na  -31  na  na  -16  -59  -43  -38 
1966  na  -18  na  na  -23  -70  -51  -44 
1967  na  -19  na  na  -9  -57  -44  -32 
1968  na  -34  na  na  1  -25  -28  -20 
1969  na  -23  na  na  18  -34  -30  -15 
1970  na  -22  na  na  15  -48  -36  -19 
1971  na  -48  na  na  7  -60  -41  -7 
1972  na  -33  na  na  3  -56  -44  -31 
1973  na  -26  na  na  42  -45  -30  -10 
1974  na  -34  na  na  -22  -72  -33  -35 
1975  na  -30  na  na  -12  -61  -39  -31 
1976  na  -4  na  91  -16  -70  -40  -35 
1977  na  -37  na  23  38  -38  -15  -11 
1978  36  -53  -36  150  -18  -61  -45  -38 
1979  69  -58  13  46  -29  -67  -48  -45 
1980  52  -52  -9  -41  -12  -55  -36  -33 
1981  36  -25  97  164  -4  -53  -35  -18 
1982  48  -9  16  25  -1  -48  -30  -12 
1983  35  1  11  28  -10  -48  -26  -15 
1984  -5  -13  28  40  -2  -54  -25  -17 
1985  22  -14  51  70  8  -30  -30  -7 
1986  0  26  59  80  23  -31  -25  5 
1987  -22  25  -62  -39  7  -30  -21  -8 
1988  30  -21  -87  14  -29  -54  -33  -33 
1989  5  -42  -25  38  -10  -43  -20  -20 
1990  41  -45  -47  67  4  -46  -25  -14 
1991  47  -33  3  178  -1  -40  -28  -8 
1992  32  -34  -42  146  8  -15  -5  -5 
1993  73  -26  68  144  18  -4  -2  9 
1994  118  -35  236  253  14  -4  -2  10 
1995  102  -42  61  177  29  -5  -2  10 
1996  59  -30  86  66  15  -7  -2  0 
1997  74  10  65  83  22  -7  -1  13 
1998  83  35  108  149  6  -3  -1  16 
1999  67  20  78  150  23  0  -2  18 
2000  71  25  65  160  3  0  -1  11 
2001  81  50  78  225  7  0  -2  19 
2002  63  19  37  181  23  0  -1  17 
2003  54  1  34  257  -5  0  -1  2 
2004  na  -10  na  na  -9  -1  -1  -6  
   
Appendix Table 4 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Sri Lanka, 1955 to 2004  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries   
      (percent) 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 









competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1955  0  -14  6  -7  -25  42  -8  105  -55 
1956  0  -8  12  -1  -16  51  -1  105  -52 
1957  0  -10  16  -1  -23  70  -2  105  -52 
1958  0  -9  23  2  -26  95  2  105  -50 
1959  0  -11  10  -4  -23  54  -4  104  -53 
1960  0  -21  3  -13  -34  42  -14  103  -58 
1961  0  -26  -2  -18  -38  32  -20  114  -63 
1962  0  -31  -15  -26  -39  -7  -29  130  -69 
1963  0  -34  -13  -27  -44  4  -30  135  -70 
1964  0  -38  -19  -31  -46  -11  -36  142  -73 
1965  0  -38  -20  -32  -43  -16  -36  158  -75 
1966  0  -44  -24  -37  -50  -23  -42  172  -79 
1967  0  -32  -17  -26  -41  -9  -30  165  -74 
1968  0  -20  -10  -17  -30  1  -19  124  -64 
1969  0  -15  -3  -11  -29  18  -12  73  -50 
1970  0  -19  -6  -15  -35  15  -17  77  -53 
1971  0  -7  -14  -9  -48  7  -11  93  -54 
1972  0  -31  -14  -24  -44  3  -28  93  -63 
1973  0  -10  3  -4  -34  42  -5  52  -38 
1974  0  -35  -22  -29  -45  -22  -34  39  -53 
1975  0  -31  -18  -25  -43  -12  -30  43  -51 
1976  0  -35  -20  -29  -45  -13  -33  65  -60 
1977  0  -11  3  -5  -28  37  -7  55  -40 
1978  0  -38  -22  -31  -52  -13  -37  51  -58 
1979  0  -45  -25  -37  -58  -17  -43  51  -62 
1980  0  -33  -19  -26  -48  -8  -32  51  -55 
1981  0  -18  -10  -11  -34  5  -17  56  -47 
1982  0  -12  -7  -8  -25  4  -12  56  -43 
1983  0  -15  -9  -11  -22  -4  -14  56  -45 
1984  0  -17  -9  -13  -26  0  -16  68  -50 
1985  0  -7  -3  -4  -23  15  -7  68  -44 
1986  0  5  4  6  -10  22  5  68  -37 
1987  0  -8  -5  -6  -6  -10  -8  53  -40 
1988  0  -33  -22  -29  -35  -32  -33  53  -56 
1989  0  -20  -13  -17  -33  -5  -20  53  -48 
1990  0  -14  -9  -13  -35  7  -14  45  -41 
1991  0  -8  -6  -7  -32  15  -8  45  -37 
1992  0  -5  -4  -4  -23  12  -5  52  -38 
1993  0  9  7  8  -14  34  10  50  -27 
1994  0  10  9  10  -18  44  11  43  -23 
1995  0  10  9  11  -20  47  11  37  -19 
1996  0  0  4  3  -16  29  2  40  -27 
1997  0  13  12  14  3  32  14  36  -16 
1998  0  16  11  16  13  20  16  35  -14 
1999  0  18  14  18  10  32  19  33  -11 
2000  0  11  8  11  10  14  11  21  -8 
2001  0  19  13  19  17  22  19  23  -3 
2002  0  17  13  17  8  32  17  23  -4 
2003  0  2  2  4  0  6  3  25  -18 
2004  0  -6  -5  -4  -4  -9  -6  22  -23 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.   
   
Appendix Table 4 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Sri Lanka, 1955 to 2004 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   Chillies  Coconut  Onion  Potato  Rice  Rubber  Tea 
Non-
covered  
1955  na  15  na  na  11  12  27  34 
1956  na  16  na  na  9  13  28  34 
1957  na  16  na  na  9  13  27  34 
1958  na  18  na  na  9  12  27  34 
1959  na  21  na  na  10  11  24  34 
1960  na  15  na  na  11  14  26  34 
1961  na  15  na  na  11  12  28  34 
1962  na  12  na  na  15  12  26  34 
1963  na  12  na  na  14  13  27  34 
1964  na  14  na  na  15  13  25  34 
1965  na  16  na  na  12  13  25  34 
1966  na  11  na  na  14  18  23  34 
1967  na  11  na  na  18  13  21  36 
1968  na  20  na  na  21  8  19  32 
1969  na  17  na  na  20  12  18  32 
1970  na  16  na  na  21  13  18  31 
1971  na  5  na  na  48  4  7  36 
1972  na  12  na  na  17  11  22  38 
1973  na  12  na  na  19  13  16  39 
1974  na  14  na  na  31  11  12  33 
1975  na  10  na  na  23  10  15  43 
1976  na  9  na  1  20  17  16  37 
1977  na  21  na  1  16  8  21  33 
1978  2  18  2  0  21  9  16  32 
1979  2  19  1  1  18  14  11  35 
1980  2  19  1  1  18  10  11  37 
1981  2  16  1  1  23  8  12  38 
1982  2  14  1  1  23  7  13  38 
1983  2  12  1  1  21  8  16  38 
1984  3  16  1  1  16  8  20  36 
1985  6  16  1  1  20  7  17  32 
1986  8  11  1  2  21  9  15  34 
1987  6  12  2  4  18  7  15  35 
1988  4  10  7  2  22  9  13  32 
1989  6  13  1  2  23  7  15  34 
1990  5  11  3  1  24  6  18  31 
1991  7  13  1  1  24  5  16  33 
1992  6  18  4  1  24  4  9  34 
1993  5  15  1  1  23  4  13  37 
1994  4  16  1  1  21  6  12  39 
1995  4  15  1  1  21  7  11  40 
1996  4  18  1  1  15  6  14  41 
1997  2  19  1  1  16  5  17  40 
1998  3  16  1  0  20  4  19  38 
1999  3  20  2  0  22  3  16  34 
2000  2  15  1  0  22  3  19  36 
2001  2  14  1  1  21  3  21  37 
2002  2  17  1  1  20  4  19  36 
2003  2  14  1  1  23  5  18  36 
2004  na  16  na  na  22  6  21  36 
a At farmgate undistorted prices  
   
Appendix Table 4 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Sri Lanka, 1955 to 2004  
(d) Trade status
a of covered
 products  
 
   Chillies  Coconut  Onion  Potato  Rice  Rubber  Tea 
1955  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1956  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1957  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1958  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1959  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1960  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1961  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1962  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1963  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1964  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1965  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1966  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1967  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1968  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1969  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1970  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1971  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1972  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1973  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1974  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1975  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
1976  na  X  na  M  M  X  X 
1977  na  X  na  M  M  X  X 
1978  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1979  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1980  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1981  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1982  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1983  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1984  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1985  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1986  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1987  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1988  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1989  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1990  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1991  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1992  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1993  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1994  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1995  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1996  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1997  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1998  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
1999  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
2000  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
2001  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
2002  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
2003  M  X  M  M  M  X  X 
2004  na  X  na  na  M  X  X 
 
a Exportable (X), import-competing (M) and nontradables (H). 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on Bandara and Jayasuriya (2007) Appendix Table 5: Shares of the global value of production and consumption of key covered 
agricultural products, South Asian economies
a, 2000-04 (percent) 
         Bangladesh  India  Pakistan  Sri Lanka  World 
Grains  Q  1.6  8.2  1.7  0.1  100 
    C  1.8  10.0  1.6  0.1  100 
   Rice  Q  5.2  15.2  1.2  0.5  100 
      C  5.2  18.3  0.7  0.5  100 
   Wheat  Q  0.4  9.5  4.8     100 
      C  0.8  12.6  4.7     100 
   Maize  Q     2.0  0.3     100 
      C     2.9  0.5     100 
   Sorghum  Q     9.5        100 
      C     14.1        100 
   Chickpea  Q     61.2        100 
      C     na        100 
Oilseeds  Q     6.5        100 
      C     8.5        100 
   Soybean  Q     4.2        100 
      C     5.0        100 
   Groundnut  Q     17.2        100 
      C     17.9        100 
   Rapeseed  Q     12.6        100 
      C     12.6        100 
   Sunflower  Q     4.7        100 
      C     5.2        100 
Tropical 
crops  Q  0.2  8.5  1.6  1.0  100 
      C  0.2  8.3  1.6  0.4  100 
   Sugar  Q  0.4  17.1  2.1     100 
      C  0.5  16.9  2.4     100 
   Cotton  Q     12.1  4.0     100 
      C     13.1  3.6     100 
   Coconut  Q           3.6  100 
      C           2.9  100 
   Rubber  Q           1.2  100 
      C           0.8  100 
   Tea  Q  1.3        6.3  100 
      C  1.4        0.4  100 
Livestock 
products             
                 
   Milk  Q     16.4  1.8     100 
      C     19.2  2.1     100 
Total of 
above 
products  Q  0.5  5.3  0.8  0.1  100 
      C  0.6  6.9  0.9  0.1  100 
Production only              100 
All covered  Q  0.6  8.5  0.9  0.1  100 
Non-covered  Q  0.5  7.9  0.8  0.2  100 
All agriculture  Q  0.6  8.3  0.8  0.1  100 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Project data and FAO Production and Commodity Balance Data.  
a. There are no Taiwan data in the FAO database.  
   
Appendix Table 6: Shares of the global value of exports and imports of key covered agricultural 
products, South Asian economies
a, 2000-03  
(percent) 
         Bangladesh  India  Pakistan  Srilanka  World 
Grains  X  0.0  3.4  0.2  0.0  100.0 
    M  0.9  0.2  0.2  0.0  100.0 
   Rice  X  0.0  12.7  0.0  0.0  100.0 
      M  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.1  100.0 
   Wheat  X  0.0  2.1  0.4     100.0 
      M  1.4  0.0  0.4     100.0 
   Maize  X     0.3  0.0     100.0 
      M     0.0  0.1     100.0 
   Sorghum  X     0.1        100.0 
      M     0.0        100.0 
   Chickpea  X     0.2        100.0 
      M     23.5        100.0 
Oilseeds  X     1.2        100.0 
      M     0.2        100.0 
   Soybean  X     2.4        100.0 
      M     0.0        100.0 
   Groundnut  X     8.3        100.0 
      M     0.0        100.0 
   Rapeseed  X     0.1        100.0 
      M     0.0        100.0 
   Sunflower  X     0.1        100.0 
      M     3.2        100.0 
         Bangladesh  India  Pakistan  Srilanka  World 
Tropical crops  X  0.0  1.2  0.2  2.7  100.0 
      M  0.3  0.6  0.8  0.0  100.0 
   Sugar  X  0.0  2.8  0.0     100.0 
      M  0.8  0.1  1.3     100.0 
   Cotton  X     0.7  1.0     100.0 
      M     4.4  2.4     100.0 
   Coconut  X           16.9  100.0 
      M           0.0  100.0 
   Rubber  X           0.7  100.0 
      M           0.1  100.0 
   Tea  X  0.3        23.9  100.0 
      M  0.0        0.3  100.0 
Livestock products  X     0.1  0.0     100.0 
      M     0.0  0.0     100.0 
   Milk  X     0.2  0.0     100.0 
      M     0.1  0.0     100.0 
Total of above 
 
X  0.0  1.1  0.1  0.5  100.0 
      M  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.0  100.0 
All exports  X  0.0  1.2  0.2  0.2  100.0 
      M  0.3  0.8  0.4  0.2  100.0 
Source: Authors’ derivation using production, trade value data at FAOSTAT.  
a. There are no Taiwan data in the FAO database.   
   
Appendix Table 7: Shares of production exported, and of consumption imported and produced 
domestically, key covered products, South Asian economies, 2000-03  
  
        Bangladesh  India  Pakistan  Srilanka 
Grains  X/Q  0  4  13  0 
    M/C  10  0  2  3 
      Q/C  98  101  119  99 
   Rice  X/Q  0  4  45  0 
    M/C  3  0  0  3 
      Q/C  102  102  186  99 
   Wheat  X/Q  0  5  5    
    M/C  61  0  2   
      Q/C  49  102  101    
   Maize  X/Q     2  0    
    M/C    0  0   
      Q/C     101  96    
   Sorghum  X/Q     0       
    M/C    0     
      Q/C     100       
Oilseeds  X/Q    2       
    M/C    0     
      Q/C    99       
   Soybean  X/Q    2       
    M/C    0     
      Q/C    94       
             
  
        Bangladesh  India  Pakistan  Srilanka 
   Groundnut  X/Q     3       
    M/C    0     
      Q/C     102       
   Sunflower  X/Q     0       
    M/C    0     
      Q/C     104       
Tropical crops  X/Q  7  3  1  63 
    M/C  21  2  7  5 
      Q/C  97  107  96  1250 
   Sugar  X/Q  0  4  1    
    M/C  34  0  12   
      Q/C  79  111  92    
   Cotton  X/Q     1  1    
    M/C    5  3   
      Q/C     96  99    
   Coconut  X/Q           17 
    M/C        2 
      Q/C           120 
   Rubber  X/Q           38 
    M/C        6 
      Q/C           150 
   Tea  X/Q  14        97 
    M/C  0      31 
      Q/C  117        2166 
Livestock           
   Milk  X/Q     0  0    
    M/C    0  0   
      Q/C     100  100    
Total of above 
 
X/Q  0  2  8  42 
    M/C  10  0  2  4 
      Q/C  98  101  111  867 
Source: Authors’ derivation using production, trade and domestic supply data in the FAO 
Commodity Balances at FAOSTAT.  